Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.
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Introduction
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Also, contemporary Bayesians typically endorse a subjective reading of probability, i.e. interpret probabilities as degrees of subjective belief. Huber ([2005] ) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence, i.e. evidence which has not been ascertained. In order to assess Huber's argument, it is crucial to combine Bayesian confirmation theory with Jeffrey conditionalisation. In this paper, we will argue that, when properly merged with Jeffrey conditionalisation, Bayesian confirmation theory escapes Huber's criticism and yields some new and appealing results. Our discussion will proceed as follows. First, we will outline a generalised version of Bayesian confirmation theory which can be readily applied under Jeffrey conditionalisation. Then, we will review a crucial requirement at the core of Huber's argument and show that it is equivocal. We will argue that on one reading it amounts to a compelling principle, whereas on an alternative reading it turns out to be highly implausible. Finally, we will show that our account of Bayesian confirmation by uncertain evidence appropriately captures the former version of the requirement and violates the latter.
Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation
For our purposes, we will consider a (non-empty) set of statements closed under truth-functional operators, such as negation, conjunction and disjunction. Bayesians commonly assume that, at a given time x, the belief state of an agent A concerning the statements in is represented by a probability function P x defined over that set.
It may occur that, from time x to y, A experiences a change in opinion concerning a particular e ∈ (provided that P x (e) is not extreme, i.e. 0 < P x (e) < 1). One important question is, then: how should A's beliefs in other statements belonging to change as a consequence?
Up to the mid-sixties, Bayesians had a ready answer only for the special case in which, at time y, A has come to believe that e is certainly true, so that P y (e) = 1 (and, correspondingly, P y (¬e) = 0). 'Classical' Bayesian updating or conditionalisation (BC) postulates that (BC) If P y (e) = 1, than for any h ∈ , P y (h) = P x (h | e).
However, it may surely also occur that A's degree of belief in e changes from time x to y without reaching certainty. What will be the value of P y (h) then? Richard Jeffrey has suggested a natural and elegant way to generalise classical Bayesian conditionalisation ([1965] , Chapter 11; also see Jeffrey [2004] , pp. 53-5). In Jeffrey conditionalisation (JC), it is assumed that (JC) For any h ∈ , P y (h) = P x (h | e)P y (e) + P x (h | ¬e)P y (¬e).
Thus in (JC), P y (h) is computed as an average of the 'old' conditional probabilities of h on e versus ¬e, weighted by the current probabilities of e and ¬e, respectively. It is easy to see that Jeffrey conditionalisation is a proper generalisation of classical Bayesian updating in the sense that (JC) implies (BC) (not the converse). Under Jeffrey conditionalisation, however, a change in belief about e prompts the updating of the prior probability P x (h) to a new value P y (h) which is generally not identical to either the conditional P x (h | e) (except when e does become certainly true) or the conditional P x (h | ¬e) (except when e becomes certainly false), but rather lies between those two values. Now consider the Bayesian notion of confirmation. Bayesian confirmation theory has been commonly elaborated and applied on the background of classical Bayesian updating. The issue has been to formalise the impact on a hypothesis h of the (often implicit, and quite restrictive) assumption of evidence e having been ascertained, i.e. precisely in case P x (e) = P y (e) = 1. Then h is said to be confirmed if and only if P y (h) = P x (h|e) > P x (h) and to be disconfirmed if and only if P y (h) = P x (h|e) < P x (h). (If P y (h) = P x (h|e) = P x (h), it is said that coming to know that e is neutral for h.)
Can Bayesian confirmation theory be extended to cases such that from time x to y the probability of e changes, but the assumption of e having been ascertained at y is relaxed? In other terms, is there any natural way to parallel Jeffrey's generalisation of classical Bayesian updating in the framework of confirmation, and provide a plausible probabilistic account of confirmation by uncertain evidence? In what follows we'll claim that the answer is in the positive.
(In essence, we will be following a proposal already made in Festa [1999], pp. 56-9.) It is well known that various alternative measures of confirmation have been proposed and defended by Bayesian theorists (see Festa [1999] and Fitelson [1999] ). For our present purposes, it will be convenient to focus on a core set of such confirmation measures which share the following interesting property: they can be defined by means of a function f depending only on P(h|e) and P(h), f being a strictly increasing function of the former value and a non-increasing function of the latter. We will call such confirmation measures 'classically P-incremental'. Classically P-incremental measures include
• the 'difference' measure, first defined by Carnap ([1950 Carnap ([ /1962 as:
• the 'ratio' measure, first defined by Keynes ([1921] , pp. 150-5) as:
• the 'odds ratio' measure, first conceived by Alan Turing (as reported by Good [1950] , pp. 62-3) as:
OR(h, e) = P(h | e)/P(¬h | e) P(h)/P(¬h) ;
• and the following measure, recently discussed by Crupi et al. [2007] 1
otherwise.
Notice that, in the notation adopted here, P(h) = P x (h) whereas, under classical Bayesian conditionalisation, P(h | e) = P y (h). Thus, when classical Bayesian conditionalisation applies, the above definitions can immediately be converted into
Here, the double subscript 'x,y' highlights the fact that confirmation is relative in an important sense: it is crucial for confirmation (disconfirmation) of a hypothesis h by a change in opinion about e to occur in the shift from one probability distribution, P x , to another, P y , such that P x (e) = P y (e). But now our claim is that these latter formulas already represent straightforward ways to generalise the corresponding confirmation measures as usually defined in the literature. This is because D x,y (h), R x,y (h), OR x,y (h) and Z x,y (h) all measure (although in different ways) the departure from the initial probability of h-P x (h)-of an appropriately updated probability P y (h). Under Jeffrey conditionalisation, generalised confirmation will amount to the departure from prior probability not of the conditional P x (h|e) (which, again, is not attained except in the special case of e having in fact being ascertained), but rather of the updated probability P y (h) to which a change in belief about the uncertainty of e will lead. Clearly, for any classically P-incremental Bayesian confirmation measure, a generalised version can be devised along these lines. Importantly, by such a move, any classically P-incremental measure will also 1 Advocates of measure D include Eells ([1982] ) and Earman ([1992] ). Advocates of measure R include Horwich ([1982] ) and Milne ([1996] ). Advocates of measure OR include Good himself ([1950] , [1983] ) as well as Fitelson ([2001] ). To the best of our knowledge, the earliest appearance of Z is in a rather fleeting discussion in Rescher ([1958] , p. 87), where a different (not P-incremental) confirmation measure is ultimately endorsed. The positive branch of Z is identical to Rips's ([2001] , p. 129) quantitative measure of 'inductive strength' and ordinally equivalent to a confirmation measure proposed by Gaifman ([1979] , p. 120). Further occurrences are in the literature on expert systems and expert judgment (see Cooke [1991] , p. 57).
satisfy a generalised condition of P-incrementality, i.e. it will be expressible by means of a function f depending only on P y (h) and P x (h), f being a strictly increasing function of the former value and a non-increasing function of the latter.
2
As a final remark, notice that, even beyond Jeffrey conditionalisation, generalised P-incremental measures are suitable of application under any kind of updating rule considered in probability kinematics. This is because they only require defined values of P x (h) and P y (h) themselves, however related. Notice that h |= e (not the converse), so that the probability of the latter given the former must equal 1. 4 Also, a Bayesian account would provide an agent A with initial probabilities P x (e) and P x (h) such that P x (e) > P x (h), again because of the logical relationship between the two statements. It is then assumed that A is initially uncertain about both e and h, so that both P x (e) and P x (h) are not extreme. It follows that coming to believe with certainty that e would confirm h, i.e. P x (h|e) > P x (h). Suppose that A, who is not wearing her glasses, looks at Stephen and comes to subjectively believe that e with a moderate level of confidence, assumed to be represented by P y (e) = 0.6 Importantly, Huber's ([2005] ) discussion of the example clearly suggests that P y (e) > P x (e), i.e. that A's observation has increased her confidence in e.
2 Such a generalised P-incrementality condition will play an important role in what follows. For this reason, we are leaving aside here various confirmation measures proposed by Bayesian theorists which are demonstrably not P-incremental: see (Carnap [1950 (Carnap [ /1962 Nozick [1981] , p. 252; Mortimer [1988] , Section 11.1; Christensen [1999] , p. 449; Joyce [1999] , Chapter 6). 3 Over the years, Bayesian theorists dealing with probability kinematics have considered various forms of updating, as prompted by different kinds of information (see, for instance, van Fraassen [1980] ; Jeffrey [1992] , Chapters 6-7). 4 Strictly speaking, in order to have h |= e, we should include 'Stephen is Scottish' as a separate background knowledge statement within and modify notation accordingly. We embedded it in e simply for ease of exposition. This, however, has no effect on the issue discussed in this paper. Now consider A looking at Stephen with her glasses on and coming to subjectively believe that e with a high level of confidence, such that P z (e) = 0.9.
Commenting on his example, Huber remarks that 'if some e speaks in favour of some h-say, because it is a logical consequence of the latter-then [. . .] getting to know that e is probably true should provide confirmation for h-and the more probable it is that e is true, the more it should do so' (p. 105; emphasis added). Here we will focus on the last part of this statement, conveying the following comparative principle of confirmation by uncertain evidence:
(H) If coming to believe with certainty that e would confirm h, then, the more probable it becomes that e is true, the more this should confirm h.
Huber considers various Bayesian confirmation measures, provides his own formal analysis of Bayesian confirmation in the 'kilt' case and argues that the difference measure D, the ratio measure R and the odds ratio measure OR all violate the allegedly compelling principle (H). He concludes that serious doubts arise on the adequacy of the Bayesian approach and elaborates the point in various ways.
As Huber himself points out, however, his own example can be read in two ways: (i) on one hand, P y and P z could be seen as referring to two alternative possible worlds, both branching from the state represented by P x ; (ii) on the other hand, P x , P y and P z could be seen as following each other in a single time sequence. Importantly, Jeffrey conditionalisation can be indifferently applied if either (i) or (ii) is adopted and, in both cases, it provides one unique value for P y (h) as well as one unique value for P z (h).
5 Yet the distinction between the possible worlds and the time sequence interpretation emphasises that principle (H) is equivocal, as it can be taken as reflecting each one of two very different adequacy requirements imposed on a candidate measure of confirmation by uncertain evidence c. If the kilt example is read in terms of possible worlds, then the most natural rendition of (H) given in our terms is:
In words, this means that the higher the increase from the initial probability of an e confirming h, the higher the confirmatory impact on h will be. 5 One may doubt that P z (h) will remain equal when arrived at from P x versus from P y , i.e. that P x (h | e) P z (e) + P x (h |¬e) P z (¬e) = P y (h | e) P z (e) + P y (h |¬e) P z (¬e).
This will be so, however, in virtue of a condition known as 'rigidity' (Jeffrey [1965] , Chapter 11) or 'invariance' (Jeffrey [2004] , p. 52), according to which P x (h | e) = P y (h | e) and P x (h | ¬e) = P y (h | ¬e). It can be proven that rigidity is implied by Jeffrey conditionalisation (indeed, it is logically equivalent to it).
If, however, the kilt example is read in terms of a single time sequence (which is Huber's main line in his paper), then principle (H) can also be seen as stating:
then c x,y (h) < c y,z (h).
As compared to (H.1), this is a completely different claim: it means that any subsequent increase (no matter how small) in the probability of an e confirming h will have a greater confirmatory impact on h than any previous increase (no matter how large) in the probability of e.
Our claim here is that, while (H.1) is a perfectly safe and sound intuitive constraint on an adequate theory of confirmation by uncertain evidence, (H.2) is utterly implausible (as it will be argued shortly).
As for (H.1), it can be shown that the following holds (see the Appendix for a proof):
Theorem. Any Bayesian confirmation measure c x,y (h) enjoying generalised P-incrementality satisfies (H.1).
By contrast, in appropriate cases, all alternative confirmation measures considered here will agree in violating (H.2)-as they should, we urge. In fact, it is easy to conceive examples where the increase from P y (e) to P z (e) is so much smaller (on any plausible standard of comparison) than the increase from P x (e) to P y (e) that (H.2) is a highly unappealing principle.
To illustrate, suppose that
By Jeffrey conditionalisation, it can be computed that P y (h) = 0.40
Similarly, it can be computed that
By the probability calculus, the following equivalence can be derived:
Since by hypothesis, P x (h | e) > P x (h), then, by Equation (1), one has P x (h | e > P x (h | ¬e) as well, whence P x (h | e) − P x (h | ¬e) > 0. Also, by hypothesis, P y (e) − P x (e) > 0. So the product of P x (h | e) − P x (h | ¬e) and P y (e) − P x (e) will be itself greater than zero. The latter inequality can be algebraically manipulated as follows:
[P x (h | e) − P x (h |¬e)] · [P y (e) − P x (e)] > 0 ⇔ P x (h | e) · [P y (e) − P x (e)] − P x (h |¬e) · [P y (e) − P x (e)] > 0 ⇔ P x (h | e) · [P y (e) − P x (e)] + P x (h |¬e) · [P y (¬e) − P x (¬e)] > 0 ⇔ P x (h | e)P x (e) + P x (h |¬e)P x (¬e) < P x (h | e)P y (e) + P x (h |¬e)P y (¬e). (2) By the theorem of total probabilities, Equation (2) can be rewritten as: P x (h) < P x (h | e)P y (e) + P x (h |¬e)P y (¬e).
Since, by hypothesis, also P z (e) − P y (e) > 0, an analogous manipulation yields:
P x (h | e)P y (e) + P x (h |¬e)P y (¬e) < P x (h | e)P z (e) + P x (h |¬e)P z (¬e). (4) And, by Jeffrey conditionalisation, Equations (3) and (4) imply:
By enjoying generalised P-incrementality, c x,y (h) is by definition a strictly increasing function of the update probability of h. Hence, from Equation (5) it immediately follows that: c x,y (h) < c x,z (h).
